Wednesday, December 9, 2015

"How to be more Successful by Creating Habits". The Power of Habit by Charles Duhig.

Hello everyone and welcome to my another book review series. What I want to talk about today is the book titled” The Power of Habit” why we do what we do and how to change it, by Charles Duhigg.

This is actually one of those books that has influenced my life massively and helped me to become the person I am today. So I wanted to share with you some of the most important things that I’ve learned from this book.

What is Habit?

So first lets start with how habits are created. Habits are part of our brains activity to help sustain the energy and efficiency of our daily activities because when habits are acquired a person does not need to engage in self-analysis when undertaking a routine task. The process by which certain behaviours become automatic is what we call habit formation.

Now we can roughly divide habits into two types. Good habits and Bad habits. Some habits can help us enjoy a more productive life such as reading a book a day, waking up early and going to the gym while others may destroy our lives by damaging our productivity and performance such as smoking, consuming fast food, alcohol addiction and constant procrastination.

Habit Loop

Three primary factors are the reason for the Habit creation, what Duhigg calls the Habit Loop. They are the Cue, The Routine and the Reward.  The cue is a trigger that tells your brain to go to automatic mode in which habit to deploys. Next is the routine, which can be physical, or mental or emotional. Lastly is reward, which helps your brain to figure out if this particular loop is worth remembering for the future. Overtime as this habit loop cue routine reward becomes more automatic and the connection between cue and the reward creates a strong sense of anticipation, which is called craving.

Eventually a habit comes force and your brain stops working so hard. Craving feeds the habit loop. Habits create neurological cravings as we associate cues for rewards as subconscious craving emerges that starts the loop. Craving follows a two-step process. One, the brain identifies the simple and obvious cue and two the brain anticipates to find rewards. The habit emerges when you see the cue as craving emerges instantaneously. Once the craving exists you will act automatically whether good habits or bad habits. The neurological process is the same. That’s why breaking bad habits is difficult.

For example if you want to develop the habit of exercising in the morning. It is a good idea to have your exercise shoes near your bed that wherever you are going to see them right when you get up and put them on and let that cue trigger the routine of you go out the door and experience the reward of the endorphins or the feeling of energized, celebrate that reward maybe give you a healthy treat to bootstrap your brain that these rewards are real, the rewards that you genuinely enjoy.

So fro me personally, when I get up in the morning I meditate I do my morning routine and then I’ve got the most important thing that I have to do on that particular time right there on my desk. It is the only thing on my desk. That’s a cue for me. That cue is planned the night before so that the exposure to that cue may trigger the emotion of taking action towards that particular goal.

How to change bad Habits

The main thing I got from the whole book was that if you are aware of the cue and reward and you just change the routine, then you are more likely to create new habits and change your old habits.

In order to change the old habit, you have to notice what cues you have that trigger the particular negative habit and try to avoid it. Or another effective way of getting rid of bad habits is by simply changing or replacing the routine while keeping the cue and reward the same, with a new one for a period of time just enough to associate that cue and reward with the new habit that will help to make your life better. 

Now in order to effectively change the old bad habits our brains require a belief that they can make it. The replacement habits only become durable new behaviours by something else, something powerful such as groups and shared experiences. A community creates belief. Effective change happens when people come together to help one another change. For habit to change people must belief it will change for that help people must believe change is possible and that helps with the help of groups.

Keystone Habit

Duhigg explains in his books how major companies such as Mc Donald’s, Procter and Gamble Starbucks and many others used habit creation into their advantage in order to effectively market their products and secure their top place in the highly competitive market. So those of you who are interested in marketing or thinking of creating your own company make sure you find this book and read it because it should be very useful for you.

The successful companies apply the keystone habit principle. For instance morning accountability check inns to ensure your team members have what they need to overcome obstacles. That keystone habit and regular conversation become embedded to your organisational culture. This principle can be applied as to the companies and to the individuals as well. The research has shown simply by initiating an exercise routine people eating better, resting better, taking better care of themselves simply by initiating an exercise routine. In the morning if you wake up and eat healthy you will be more likely to eat healthy through the day. 

Willpower

Willpower is identified in studies as single most important factor in success. The best way to strengthen the willpower is to make a habit of it. Willpower is both a learnable skill and a muscle. It gets tired as it works harder so there is less power left over for other things. That’s why productivity experts recommend tackling the hardest tasks or the most creative ones first each day if you can or tidiest routine tasks can follow.

According to the research’s willpower has the single biggest correlate with success.  Willpower out predicts almost everything for what ever it is you wanna achieve in your life. The fact that will power out predicts IQ by a factor of two for academic performance. You can take two kids with one higher level of IQ and another higher willpower and try to predict who’s academic performance is going to be higher, then the one with higher or stronger willpower will be twice more likely to achieve better results in their academic performance. Therefore If you want to succeed in the so called long run you should work on and cultivate your willpower as well.

Conclusion

So make sure you follow those three steps of building new habits by controlling the cue, routine and ritual or by slightly changing the ritual while keeping the cue and reward the same if you want to replace your old bad habit into a new one.  Don’t forget about identifying your keystone habit, which is the essential catalyst of your positive habits and successful performance, which we mentioned in this case as exercising or going to the gym as you call it. And lastly make sure you practise and strengthening your willpower by constantly working on improving yourself and creating a better version of yourself.





Saturday, October 24, 2015

Review of the book Aleph by Paulo Coelho

I decided to start a new column in my blog, as from now on I plan to share the summaries and my views on the books that I finish reading. By doing so I believe it will encourage me to spend more time on reading and finish at least one book a week and give the reader insight on what to expect from the books.

A quick review of the book titled "Aleph" by Paulo Coelho that I just finished reading. The story seems to be about the real life story of author himself in his journey of finding his place at his kingdom. In order to do so he needs to be forgiven for his sins that he has committed in his previous lives. At this stage author’s spiritual beliefs and religious views are revealed as he sees himself as a priest who used to take part in trails of women accused in witchcrafty by Orthodox Church in his previous life. In order to fill the emptiness of his soul and reacquire his inner kingdom Paulo takes a journey to Russia and along the way on Trans Siberian train he is overwhelmed by the company of the Turkish girl Hilal. She is a stubborn and ambitious girl who makes her way through all the obstacles to join the group Paulo is traveling with. She is also the person who needs to forgive Paulo as she was the one who was executed because of her love to Paulo in their previous life. The story is highly focused on the spiritual beliefs of the author and his views about reincarnation as well as the elements of suffering and need for forgiveness in Christianity is widely portrayed.

 To conclude, I would rate this book maximum 3 out of 5 as it seems author did his best to make not so exciting storyline as interesting as possible. In addition the first chapters seem to be more attractive as the story starts with Paulo’s conversation with his mentor J. who is guiding him in his personal development path. However, along the journey this focus slides from the personal development to mind penetrating subjective views of author on various issues such as reincarnation, good and bad, happiness and etc. which makes it a bit skeptical for the reader to agree with him in all occasions. In addition the character of the main hero portrays sometimes egotistic and selfish traits from the conversations with people around him of an arrogant writer who thinks as of himself as the center of the universe.

Saturday, January 10, 2015

NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AS A THREAT TO SECURITY IN SOUTH CAUCASUS


JAVID ALISGANDARLI
SOAS University of London
E-mail: javid_alisgandarli@yahoo.com

NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
AS A THREAT TO SECURITY IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

Açar sözlər: Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi, Cənubi Qafqaz, təhlükəsizlik, Ermənistan, Azərbaycan
Ключевые слова: Нагорно-карабахский конфликт, Южный Кавказ, безопасность, Армения, Азербайджан
Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, South Caucasus, Security, Armenia, Azerbaijan

Multiple armed conflicts emerged among post-Soviet states following the collapse of the USSR. The South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia remain critically affected by these conflicts. While these conflicts remain semi-dormant for now, there are no guarantees that these “frozen conflicts” will not erupt. This poses a serious threat to the sovereignty, security and economic development of the region. This paper tackles the question of why the twenty-year negotiation process in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict has failed to deliver a peaceful resolution and what can be done about it. It gives an overall idea of the security, social and political situation in the South Caucasus and examines the interests of the main actors in the region. The paper further assesses the negotiation process, explains the major obstacles preventing the reconciliation process and develops recommendations for a possible resolution to the conflict.
The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted into violence in 1988 as a result of a referendum that declared the region independent from Azerbaijan (1). Azerbaijan did not recognize the legitimacy of this referendum because the Azerbaijani population neither participated nor had a voice in this vote. The war escalated until both sides reached a ceasefire agreement called the “Bishkek protocol” in May 12, 1994. The consequences from the conflict were devastating: approximately 30,000 people died and about 1,000,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from their homes (2). The conflict resulted in the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territory as Armenian forces occupied not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also seven adjacent regions. The UN Security Council passed four resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (822, 853, 874, 884(3)) demanding the immediate release of Azerbaijan’s occupied territories, emphasizing the right of IDPs to return to their former homes. The UN General Assembly recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and repeated the demand for withdrawal of armed forces from the occupied territories in March 2009. But, unfortunately, neither the four resolutions of the Security Council nor the demands of the General Assembly have been implemented. Some officials, such as former US ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, argue that countries sometimes do not act on Security Council resolutions, as there is no enforcement mechanism (4).
This conflict is a clash between the principle of self-determination of nations and the territorial integrity principle of states, both of which are included as fundamental human rights in the charter of the United Nations. The Armenian side argues that the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) has the right of self-determination under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 3 and provides three supporting arguments (5):  NK declared its independence (02.09.1991) before the Azerbaijan Republic (18.10.1991); Azerbaijan refused to be a successor to the Soviet Union, so it cannot claim its borders under the Soviet Union; and all principles of international law are equal and no principle can be prioritized over another. Therefore, the principle of territorial integrity cannot be overridden by the self-determination principle. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani side makes a strong point through its claim that the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh has already used its right to self-determination (1923) and decided to stay under the rule of Azerbaijan SSR (6), and that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has been violated under the “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” article 46.1. Nothing in this declaration “may be interpreted as implying for any state, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations” (7).
The leaders from both sides have met several times to derive a peaceful solution to the conflict. For example, the OSCE Lisbon Summit (1996) laid out basic principles for the resolution of the conflict (8). These stipulate the political status of NK; the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories; security guarantees for Karabakh and Armenia in case the occupied territories are returned; and the return and resettlement of the Azerbaijani IDPs. These four issues are at the core of the “Madrid principles,” the main framework for the peace process led by the Minsk Group (9).
Despite the many efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict, agreement has remained elusive. Speculation suggests influence from third parties, interested in maintaining the current status quo, may be involved. The armed attack on the Armenian parliament, October 27, 1999, is sometimes offered as evidence for this conjecture (10). A group of five armed men killed the two de-facto decision-makers in Armeina’s political leadership - Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and the Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan. While some argue that the killings resulted from an internal power struggle, others suggest that Russian Special Services instigated this terrorist attack to undermine the peace agreement, which was about to be signed at the Istanbul summit of the OSCE (11). Such suspicions appear to be well grounded. Russia’s actions in the region are based on historic colonialist claims and preference for weak neighbors willing to follow Russia’s interests. The emergence of its close neighbor, Azerbaijan, as a major international energy supplier setting its foreign policy independent of Russia, while forging closer economic ties to Europe and the US presents Moscow with security concerns.
Given this impasse, an obvious question must be asked: what is necessary to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict considering the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus? The conflicting parties believe that alliances with external actors are necessary in the event of renewed hostilities. Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis are continuously trying to expand their military capability, inciting the other to react accordingly. This creates an “arms race” that, inevitably, results in further destabilization of the region (12). Mediators since 1994 have attempted to induce each side to accept concessions, but unfortunately, little tangible progress has been made.
In order to understand the complexity of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict one has to examine the interests of the region’s major influential actors. External actors can be categorized into two main groups: those interested in keeping the current status quo (Russia, Iran and the US), and actors interested in cooperation and peaceful resolution (Turkey, the EU, and Georgia).
As co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia has direct influence in the conflict resolution process. Russia’s position is clearly ambiguous given its direct involvement in the conflict as a security provider for Armenia. The close partnership with Armenia enables Russia to have a strong strategic foothold in the Caucasus and strengthens its position as the most powerful actor in the region when compared to its main rivals ‑ Turkey and Iran. As a security guarantor of Armenia, Russia still maintains its military bases in the country. The peaceful resolution of the conflict is not favorable for Russia, as peace would facilitate Armenia’s economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, which would eventually weaken Russia’s foothold in the region and damage its influence on Armenia.
The US, another co-chair of the Minsk Group, has limited interest in changing the status quo because of its disinterest in confronting Russia over regional matters (not with standing the current Ukrainian situation). Friedman (2011), in his book The Next Decade, argues that the US is ready to “turn a blind eye” to the Caucasus in return for Russia’s concession in Central Asia and to gain more leverage over its troubles with Iran. Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains a matter of peripheral interest for the US (13).
Iran is another actor willing to maintain the status quo. Although also an Islamic state, its geopolitical and geostrategic interests places it as one of Armenia’s key supporters in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The government of Iran sees the existence of the Azerbaijan Republic as a potential threat to its own security. With more than 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis living in the Islamic Republic of Iran (14), a strong Azerbaijan taking a leading role in the region could potentially evoke an ethnic movement inside Iran, which could be considered a serious challenge to the national security of the State of Iran (15).
Turkey, however and unlike Russia or Iran, does not need to use the conflict to maintain its regional influence. With its active involvement in multiple international energy projects and large investments in the region’s economy its position as a major player in the Caucasus is secure. Peaceful resolution of the conflict and a more stable region is best for Turkey’s economic and security interests.
The EU and Georgia are also interested in a peaceful resolution to the conflict because of their own close involvement in regional energy projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which decreases Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. In addition to cooperative economic projects, Georgia also suffers from conflicts with Russia. Georgia’s attempt to liberate territories resulted in a five-day Georgian-Russian war (August 2008), which triggered a de-facto invasion of Georgia by Russia. Therefore, Georgia hopes to see Russia’s regional influence diminish with a resolution to the Karabakh conflict, which would further serve Georgia’s own territorial interests.
In addition to the external actors’ interests concerning the status quo, it is argued that the conflict further remains “frozen” as the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan have little real interest in concluding the negotiation process. The political elites in both countries continue to use the conflict for their partisan gains. The conflict is used effectively as an excuse for perceived shortcomings in each nation’s government, the lack of democratic progress, and constraints on freedom of expression. Such reticence to reach resolution is exhibited too by OSCE Minsk group members. As the co-chairs themselves include parties interested in maintaining the status quo, the OSCE Minsk group cannot fulfill its responsibilities as an effective mediator in the resolution process.
A new approach is required to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After twenty years of unproductive negotiations regional democratization, economic cooperation and integration remain nascent.  If we evaluate the negotiation process with focus on the main dispute we can conclude that there is actually one particular issue over which both sides cannot agree. This is the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan accepts Nagorno-Karabakh as constituent of its own territorial integrity. Armenia, however, recognizes the region as an independent state or a part of the Armenian Republic. Unable to reach Agreement over the legal status of the region is the key to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Only after the legal status of the region has been established will the processes of regional cooperation and integration, and nonviolent Caucasian identity construction, take place and lasting peace and stability have a chance in the region.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.De Waal, T. (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York University Press.
2. Croissant, M.P. (1998). The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict - Causes and Implications. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers.
3. Resolution 822 (1993, April 30); Resolution 853 (1993, July 29); Resolution 874 (1993, October 14); Resolution 884 (1993, November 12). Retrieved from http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm [Accessed on September 4, 2014]
4. Matthew Bryza: “The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce Karabakh resolution” (2014, August 25). Retrieved from http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/59208.html [Accessed on September 12, 2014]
5. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007, September 13). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf  [Accessed on September 4, 2014]
6. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR. Retrieved from http://mfa.gov.az/index.php?options=content&id=812 [Accessed on September 4, 2014]
7. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007, September 13). Article 46.1, p.14. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [Accessed on September 4, 2014]
8. Lisbon Document (1996). Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true [Accessed on September 10 2014]
9. Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries (2009, July 10). Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/mg/51152 [Accessed on September 11, 2014]
10. Armenia's prime minister killed in parliament shooting [Accessed on 1999, October 27] Retrieved from
 http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9910/27/armenia.04/ [Accessed on September 4, 2014]
11. Monaghan, Andrew; Plater Zyberk, Henry (22 May 2007). Misunderstanding Russia: Alexander Litvinenko. [Accessed on September 5, 2014]
12. Posen, Barry (Spring 1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, 35, 1, pp.27-47. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/posen/security-dilemma.pdf [Accessed on September 5, 2014]
13. Friedman, G. (2011). The Next Decade.  New York: Random House Inc
14. Southern Azerbaijan (2008, March 25). Retrieved from http://www.unpo.org/members/7884 [Accessed on September 11, 2014]
15. Keskin, A. (2013, Aprel 28). Iran exaggerating problem with Azerbaijan as distraction. Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-313877-iran-exaggerating-problem-with-azerbaijan-as-distraction.html [Accessed on September 11, 2014]
16. Chorbajian, L., Donabedian, P., Mutafian C. (1994) The Caucasian Knot. The History and Geo-Politics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London: Zed Books Ltd
17. Hovhannisyan, N. (1999) The Karabakh Problem. Factors, Criteria, Variants of Solution. Yerevan: Zangak
18. Johannes, R. (2008) The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A Brief  Historical Outline. Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster
19. Kruger, H. (2009) The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis, published by Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
20. The Armenia – İran Relationship. Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus Region (2013, January 17). Retrieved from http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-armenian-iran-relationship/Armenian-Iran%20relationship.pdf [Accessed on September 11, 2014]
21. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007, September 13). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [Accessed on September 4, 2014]

CAVİD ƏLISGƏNDƏRLI
London SOAS Universiteti

DAĞLIQ QARABAĞ MÜNAQİŞƏSİ
CƏNUBİ QAFQAZDA TƏHLÜKƏSİZLİYƏ HƏDƏ KİMİ

Məqalədə Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsinin meydana çıxma səbəbləri, regiona təsiri mə­sələlərindən bəhs olunur. Göstərilir ki, münaqişə xarakterinə görə, ilk baxışdan göründüyü kimi sadəcə etnik münaqişə deyil, geopolitik münaqişədir və bu səbəbdən də həllinə nail ol­maq bir o qədər də asan deyil. Bundan əlavə, məqalədə münaqişəyə münasibətdə beynəlxalq təşkilatların mövqeyi nəzərdən keçirilir. BMT Təhlükəsizlik Şurasının qətnamələri, ATƏT-in Minsk qrupunun həmsədrlərinin fəaliyyəti haqda məlumat verilir və onların nəticəsiz qalması səbəblərinin araşdırılmasına cəhd edilir. Həmçinin ayrı-ayrılıqda region dövlətlərinin, ABŞ-ın və Avropa Birliyinin münasibəti məsələləri işıqlandırılır. Göstərilir ki, Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsi yalnız Azərbaycan və Ermənistan Respublikalarının deyil, bütünlükdə regionun inkişafını ləngidir, həmçinin bütünlükdə regionun təhlükəsizliyinə hədədir. 

ДЖАВИД АЛИСКАНДАРЛИ
Унивеситет SOAS (Лондон)

НАГОРНО-КАРАБАХСКИЙ КОНФЛИКТ
КАК УГРОЗА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ НА ЮЖНОМ КАВКАЗЕ

            В статье рассказывается о причинах и влияние Нагорно-Карабахского конфликта на ситуацию в регионе. Указывается, что этот конфликт по своему характеру не только этнический, а геополитический конфликт, что и осложняет процесс ее решения. В статье также рассматривается позиция международных организаций к конфликту. Рассказывается о постановлениях Совета Безопасности ООН, расследуется деятель­ность сопредседателей Минской группы ОБСЕ, делается попытка выявления причин о безрезультатности их деятельности. Также в отдельности рассматривается позиция США, ЕС и региональных государств в отношении к конфликту. Указывается, что Нагорно-Карабахский конфликт не только тормозит развитие на Южном Кавказе, а также является угрозой безопасности всего региона.


            Rəyçilər: t.e.n.A.R.Göyüşov, t.e.d.P.Q.Darabadi
            Bakı Dövlət Universiteti Türk xalqları tarixi kafedrasının 2 dekabr 2014-cü il tarixli iclasının qərarı ilə çapa məsləhət görülmüşdür (pr.№3).


Day 23: GRE Vocabulary, Success Journal, Kick-Boxing, Balance of life

Learning new words has been something I never enjoyed. The idea of having to write a vocabulary, and memorize words always irritated me. How...